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I. INTRODUCTION: THE STATE OF THE MARITAL UNION
There are widespread concerns nationwide about the impact of the
towering divorce rate currently plaguing this nation. Roughly fifty
percent of new marriages entered into today can expect to end in di-
vorce.' Most Americans are aware that divorce rates in the United
States rose steadily through the seventies and through the mid-eight-
ies.2 In fact, the divorce rate has been rising since the mid-nineteenth
century.3 What many do not know is that the precipitous increase has
* ©Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAw REvIEw.
1. See Kristi Wright, Until Death Do Us Part; Covenants, Other Programs Help
Couples Keep Their Vows, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Dec. 28, 1997, at 1E.
2. See 39 NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, No. 12, SuPP. 2, MONTHLY Vi-
TAL STATISTICS REPORT 7 (divorce rate in 1940 was 2.0 per 1000 population; 4.0
percent per 1000 population in 1972 and 5.0 in 1985).
3. See Andrew Cherlin, The Trends: Marriage, Divorce, Remarriage, in FAMILY IN
TRANSITION 80, 83-87 (Arlene Skolnick & Jerome Skolnick eds., 5th ed. 1986).
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leveled off and remained steady since the mid-eighties.4 Nevertheless,
many Americans, and especially their lawmakers, are extremely in-
terested in curbing the American divorce rate. Anyone who has exper-
ienced the impact of a divorce would say that this is a worthwhile
aspiration.
Divorce wreaks havoc on children and on families, both economi-
cally and socially. These effects are well documented. Increasing
numbers of children are raised in single-parent families. 5 Single-par-
ent families earn significantly less on average than two-parent house-
holds.6 Fathers, in the aggregate nationwide, are behind in child
support payments totaling several billion dollars. 7 Children raised in
single-parent homes are more likely to suffer from behavioral and
emotional problems, to become sexually active, to use drugs, and to
fare poorly in school.8 Commentators refer to the American family as
being in crisis. The previously mentioned conditions indicate that this
could be correct.
Given the plight involved in the culture of divorce, many have be-
gun searching for ways to fix the near preponderance of broken Ameri-
can marriages. Taking what some feel is a rather myopic view, many
lawmakers and commentators have begun putting the blame for the
staggering divorce rate on no-fault divorce laws. In almost every state
legislature, the nostalgic yearning for some return to the previous re-
gime of fault divorce law can be found, and Louisiana is one state that
passed legislation aimed at putting some fault back into divorce
proceedings .9
4. See id.; see also Edward B. Furey Jr., The Dwindling Divorce Rate, NEWSDAY, Oct.
1, 1997, at A49 (The divorce rate in the United States peaked in 1980 at 5.2 per
1000 populations compared to 4.6 per 1000 population in 1994 down from 4.7 per
1000 population in each of years 1992, 1991 and 1990).
5. See DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, FAMILY AND NATION 147 (1986)(Female-headed
households are expected to grow at five times the rate of two-parent households
in the last two decades of the 1900s).
6. According to the statistics of the Census Bureau, "[t]he median income for a mar-
ried couple with children in 1994 was $47,244; for a household headed by a single
mother, it was $14,902." Dana Milbank, Blame Game: No-Fault Divorce Law is
Assailed in Michigan, and Debate Heats Up, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 1996, at Al.
7. The estimated amount of child support that was not paid in 1985 was 3.7 billion.
See Harry D. Krause, Child Support Reassessed: Limits of Private Responsibility
and the Public Interest, in DIvoRCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 166, 174 (Ste-
phen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990).
8. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking about Marriage and Divorce, 76
VA. L. REv. 9, 31-2 (1990)(citing studies that demonstrated that "children of di-
vorce exhibited more delinquent and antisocial behavior, used more mental
health services, and performed worse in school").
9. See Covenant Marriage Act, LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:272-73 (West Supp. 1998).
The Act took effect on August 15, 1997.
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Louisiana enacted legislation that will allow its state's couples to
opt to have a "covenant marriage" rather than a standard marriage.
The language of the statute reads:
A covenant marriage is a marriage entered into by one male and one female
who understand and agree that the marriage between them is a lifelong rela-
tionship. Parties to a covenant marriage have received counseling emphasiz-
ing the nature and purposes of marriage and the responsibilities thereto.
Only when there has been a complete and total breach of the marital covenant
commitment may the non-breaching party seek a declaration that the mar-
riage is no longer legally recognized.1 0
As this language indicates, the legislation precludes couples who
have chosen to have a "covenant marriage" from access to the state's
general no-fault divorce law. The law declares that covenant mar-
riage couples may only have their marriage dissolved when a "non-
breaching party" can show that there has been a "complete and total
breach of the marriage covenant commitment."'" The legislation sets
forth "exclusive means to terminate a covenant marriage."12 These
means do not include the ground of "living apart," or a six month sepa-
ration, which is available in the no-fault divorce law.' 3 However, the
covenant marriage can be dissolved after two years of separation.14
Couples choosing covenant marriage must also document that they re-
ceived pre-marital counseling and agree to undergo counseling before
seeking a divorce.' 5
Legislators in Louisiana and other like-minded advocates hope
that solutions such as "covenant marriage" will induce couples to
enter marriage more solemnly and be less likely to seek divorce.16
10. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:272 (West Supp. 1998).
11. Id. § 9:272A-
12. Historical and Statutory Notes to LA. REy. STAT. ANN. § 9:272 (West Supp. 1998).
13. Compare LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:307 (West Supp. 1998)(setting forth the "exclu-
sive grounds" for dissolution of a covenant marriage) with LA. Crv. CODE ANN.
art. 103(1) (West 1993)(setting forth the no-fault divorce ground for ordinary
marriages in Louisiana).
14. See LA. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 9:307A(5) (West Supp. 1998).
15. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN § 9:273A(1) (West Supp. 1998), Covenant marriage; con-
tents of declaration of intent:
We do solemnly declare that marriage is a covenant between a man
and a women who agree to live together as husband and wife for so long
as they both shall live. We have chosen each other carefully and dis-
closed to one another everything which could adversely affect the deci-
sion to enter into this marriage. We have received premarital counseling
on the nature, purposes, and responsibilities of marriage. We have read
the Covenant Marriage Act, and we understand that a Covenant Mar-
riage is for life. If we experience marital difficulties, we commit our-
selves to take all reasonable efforts to preserve our marriage, including
marital counseling.
Id. § 9:273A(1).
16. Tony Perkins, Louisiana state representative and the author of the covenant
marriage legislation, said in an interview that he believed the law's definition of
"breach of the marital contract" is based on "what was historically the law back
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Their battle cry calls for strengthening marriage. Covenant marriage
bills and other no-fault alternatives have been introduced into the leg-
islatures in almost every state. Louisiana was the first state to enact
a covenant marriage bill.17 There appears to be some evidence that
many Americans are at least nominally in favor of "strengthening the
marital bonds" as well. In a Time/CNN poll, fifty percent of those sur-
veyed answered "yes" when asked if it should be harder for couples to
get divorced.1 8 If the premarital counseling, fault and fault-like di-
vorce grounds, and reinforced pledge of commitment involved in the
covenant marriage experiment operate to decrease the divorce rate in
Louisiana, then many states will likely follow suit.
This Comment will examine covenant marriage in light of the ex-
periences of both fault and no-fault divorce laws. It will begin with an
overview of fault and no-fault divorce law. Next, the Louisiana cove-
nant marriage legislation will be discussed. The spotlight will be on
whether this legislative salve will be able to deliver what its propo-
nents intend. There are many legal and societal components of cove-
nant marriage that suggest that it will not.
It is this Comment's proposition that returning to fault based di-
vorce law will do little to curb the American divorce rate. The divorce
culture of the latter half of the twentieth century was the product of a
changing society. It was not principally the product of no-fault di-
vorce. Putting the blame squarely on the shoulders of no-fault divorce
laws for the high divorce rate is misplaced. In reality, the fault system
operated like a no-fault system in disguise. Couples facing fault di-
vorce laws were adept at evading these laws in the 1950s. They will
be no less adept at evading covenant marriage's return to fault princi-
ples in the 1990s. The very people who are the least adept at evading
fault-like divorce laws, the poor and abused spouses, will be hurt the
most by a return to fault divorce laws as embodied in covenant
marriage.
when there was weight to the marriage contract." Daniel Radosh, Covenant Mar-
riage: Tightening the Ties that Bind, PLAYBOY, Dec. 1, 1997, at 59.
17. An online search of newspaper articles found similar covenant marriage legisla-
tion being discussed in Virginia, Indiana, Washington, Kansas, Alabama, Ten-
nessee, Nebraska, Ohio, and Oklahoma. Subsequent to the writing of this article,
Arizona has followed Louisiana in enacting similar covenant marriage legisla-
tion. See Amiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-901 through 25-906 (West 1998).
18. See Wendy King & Walter Kim, The Ties That Bind. Should Breaking Up Be
Harder To Do? The Debate Over Easy Divorce Rages On, TimE, Aug. 18, 1997, at
48 (61% said it should be harder for couples with young children to get divorced,
and 64% agreed that people should be required to take a marriage education
course before they could get their licenses. However, when asked if the govern-
ment should make it harder for people to get divorced, only 37% said "yes.").
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF FAULT AND NO-FAULT DIVORCE
Under the old fault divorce regime, the law in every state required
a showing that one of the parties to the marriage had violated one of
the narrowly defined marital transgressions. Most typically, these in-
cluded adultery, cruelty, and desertion.19 Other grounds included cer-
tain crimes-insanity, homosexuality, and drug addiction. 20 Only an
"innocent" or "non-breaching" spouse could apply for a divorce. That
is, only a spouse who had not also committed one of the defined
breaches of the marriage listed above could be granted a divorce. Fur-
ther, if the court concluded sua sponte that the couple had colluded
together to fabricate a fault ground, the court was to deny the divorce.
A non-breaching spouse continuing a relationship with a spouse who
had breached one of the fault grounds was viewed as condoning the
behavior and would be denied a divorce for that transgression. On
paper, the grounds for divorce under the fault regime were quite diffi-
cult to prove.
In reality, the substance of dissolution proceedings diverged widely
from the rigid form of the fault divorce laws.21 By the early 1960s
(and long before that) "divorce-seeking couples often subverted or ig-
nored the restrictive fault rules. The most common evasions were mi-
gration and collusion; couples would either go to a jurisdiction with
more lenient divorce laws, or would perjure themselves before the
court to manufacture instances of marital 'fault.'"22 "In the 1960s,
ninety percent of American divorces on fault grounds were granted
without contest."23
By the 1960s, many commentators felt that American divorce court
proceedings had transformed into "adversary theater[s] of the ab-
surd."2 4 American society was increasingly viewing marriage and the
family as less of an autonomous unit and more of a partnership be-
tween individuals that was "terminable at will when it failed to meet
the needs or desires of either party."2 5 Divorce evolved into "a regret-
table, but necessary, legal definition of a marital failure, where very
often the factors leading to the marriage breakdown were not all one-
sided and based solely on the fault of one guilty party, but they were
also caused by the incompatibility and irreconcilable differences of
19. See Laura Bradford, Note, The Counterrevolution: A Critique of Recent Proposals
to Reform No-Fault Divorce Laws, 49 STAN. L. REV. 607, 610 (1997).
20. See id.
21. See id. at 611.
22. Id.
23. Id. (citing Scott, supra note 8, at 16).
24. J. Herbie DiFonzo, Alternatives to Marital Fault: Legislative and Judicial Experi-
ments in Cultural Change, 34 IDAHo L. REv. 1, 2 (1997).
25. Bradford, supra note 19, at 611.
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both spouses."2 6 Opinion turned against the fictions and excesses of
the rigid fault regime. It was at this point that no-fault divorce laws
began to enter the picture. This changed attitude toward divorce
drove the movement toward no-fault divorce laws, not the other way
around.
Central to the movement toward no-fault divorce was the preserva-
tion of judicial integrity.2 7 No-fault divorce laws were never originally
conceived as either a way of encouraging easy divorces or encouraging
serial marriages. 28 Rather, they were intended to give trial judges
more latitude to explore whether or not each marriage was viable on a
case-by-case basis. 29 Under a no-fault system, the trial judge would
no longer be bound to find that the parties had proven specific marital
transgressions. Instead, the judge was to "inquire into the whole pic-
ture of the marriage" to see if it was irretrievably broken.30
However, the legacy of no-fault divorce law has not been this indi-
vidual evaluation of the viability of each marriage. Rather, in most
instances it has resulted in marriages being dissolved at the request of
both or even one of the parties. Like the fault regime before it, the no-
fault regime simply mirrored what unhappy couples desired because
no-fault essentially rubber stamped most divorces. The main differ-
ence was that without the specific requirements of fault to prove, di-
vorce hearings were less about fiction and more about the fact that
society had learned that marriages often break down. Between 1969
and 1985, all fifty states incorporated no fault provisions into their
laws governing divorce.31
As was noted earlier, the divorce rate has been increasing since the
mid-nineteenth century.3 2 It increased steadily up through the con-
clusion of World War II.33 From the period of about 1950 through
1962, the annual divorce rates were lower than statistical models
26. Peter Nash Swisher, Reassessing Fault Factors in No-Fault Divorce, 31 FAM. L.Q.
269, 270 (1997); see also Max Rheinstein, The Law of Divorce and the Problem of
Marriage Stability, 9 VAND. L. REV. 633 (1956).
27. See Bradford, supra note 19, at 613-14.
28. See id.
29. See Scott, supra note 8, at 17.
30. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Rights of Passage: Divorce Law in Historical Perspec-
tive, 63 OR. L. REv. 649, 667 (1984).
31. California was the first state to adopt no-fault divorce provisions in 1969, and
South Carolina was the last in 1985. See Bradford, supra note 19, at 617 n.53.
Currently, fifteen states have pure no-fault divorce grounds, twenty one states
have added a no-fault provision to their existing fault grounds, and fourteen
states and the District of Columbia have combined fault grounds with a no-fault
provision based on voluntary separation or incompatibility. See id. at 613;
Herma Hill Kay, Beyond No-Fault: New Directions in Divorce Reform, in DrVORcE
REFORM AT THE CROSSROADs 211 n.18 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay
eds., 1990).




would have predicted based on the long term increases since the mid-
nineteenth century.3 4 Starting around 1962, the divorce rates rose
sharply and have continued to do so until the mid-eighties, when they
leveled off remaining at that same high level. 35
The laying of blame on no-fault divorce for the precipitous rise in
the divorce rate of the latter half of the twentieth century warrants an
examination of the rate of increase of divorce in the no-fault era as
compared to the preceding fault era. Just prior to California becoming
the first state to adopt no-fault divorce grounds in 1970, the national
divorce rate was 3.5 per thousand.36 That increased to 5.1 per thou-
sand in 1977.37 During the first seven years of having the no-fault
option, California's divorce rate jumped more than forty-five per-
cent. 38 Armed with these statistics, it is no wonder that many blame
no-fault divorce for the increase in the American divorce rate.
While this stark increase suggests that no-fault divorce laws have
caused divorce rates to sky-rocket, a more expansive view of the data
is necessary before the big picture of the American divorce rate can be
seen. Beginning in 1962, the national divorce rate began to outgrow
what previous mathematical models would have predicted.39 This se-
vere increase in the divorce rate preceded the introduction of no-fault
divorce in California by a full eight years. California introduced no-
fault divorce in 1970. Commentators have further noted that "the in-
crease in divorce [was] not.., a phenomenon restricted solely to states
that... adopted... [no-fault] standard[s]."40 To illustrate this point,
researchers found that, between 1970 and 1974, the divorce rates in
Arkansas, Mississippi, Rhode Island, and South Dakota climbed at an
increased rate compared to the increase in the divorce rate in Ne-
braska for the same period. This occurred even though Nebraska
adopted no-fault divorce laws in 1972, while the other states men-
tioned made no significant changes in their divorce laws.4 1 Using Ne-
braska as a model, researchers concluded in 1979 that, when
Nebraska switched to no-fault in 1972, there was an increase in the
rate of divorce. However, the increase was consistent with a sharp
upswing in the divorce rate that began in the early 1960s before the
onset of no-fault divorce laws. 4 2
34. See id.
35. See Furey, supra note 4, at A49.
36. See Alan H. Frank et al., No Fault Divorce and the Divorce Rate: The Nebraska
Experience-An Interrupted Time Series Analysis and Commentary, 58 NEB. L.
REV. 1, 5 (1979).
37. See id.
38. See id. at 6.
39. See Cherlin, supra note 3, at 83-87.
40. Frank et al., supra note 36, at 8.
41. See id. at 8-9.
42. See id. at 18.
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III. THE LOUISIANA SOLUTION FOR TAMING THE
DIVORCE RATE
It's a starry night at Brennan's in the French Quarter. A 10-carat diamond
has been nestled in the Bananas Foster by a handsome swain under the influ-
ence of one too many romantic comedies. As his lovely maiden scoops up the
ring, he asks, "Will you marry me?" Her face lights up with joy. But a mo-
ment later a slight frown crosses her pretty brow. Looking deep into his eyes,
she inquires, "Do you mean really, really marry you?"43
When a Louisianan gets engaged these days, he or she has more
meaningful decisions to make than what china pattern to select and
setting a date for the ceremony. Louisianans now have to decide
whether they want to get married or, as some have termed it, "really
married." In other less dramatic words, they must determine whether
they want to enter into a standard marriage or into a covenant mar-
riage. On August 15, 1997, the controversial Covenant Marriage Act
officially went into effect. 44 The next section of the Comment will dis-
cuss the obvious and not-so-obvious implications of this new legisla-
tion; what it will mean for the couples who opt for it; and what it will
mean for couples who have elected a covenant marriage and desire to
exit it.
A. An Overview of Covenant Marriage
There are two outstanding features of the covenant marriage legis-
lation. The first is the mandated premarital and predivorce counsel-
ing requirements. The second is the restricted divorce grounds that
foreclose covenant marriage couples from access to the state's current
no-fault divorce law. These restrictive divorce components feature a
return to the fault regime of the past, along with some newer less
traditional (strikingly similar to fault) grounds for divorce. A third
less obvious component of covenant marriage may turn out to be the
mandated disclosure prior to the marriage of "everything which could
adversely affect the decision to enter ... [the] marriage."45 An addi-
tional lingering question is whether the principles of conflict of laws
will take the wind out of covenant marriage's sails, as parties may be
able to establish domicile in any of the states that do not recognize
covenant marriage and obtain a divorce under that state's ordinary
no-fault divorce laws. However, the ultimate question in discussing
these and other features of covenant marriage is whether they will
truly lead to lower divorce rates in Louisiana.
43. Margaret Carlson, Till Depositions Do Us Part, TImE, July 7, 1997, at 21.
44. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:272-73 (West Supp. 1998).
45. Id. § 9:273A(1).
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1. The Counseling Components
A marriage license should be at least as hard to obtain as a driver's license.
Requiring the marital equivalent of being able to parallel park might knock a
little sense into heads more concerned with registering at Bloomingdale's than
deciding whether the kids will be baptized.
4 6
Parties entering into a covenant marriage must sign a declaration
of intent. Included in this attestation is a clause indicating that the
couple has undergone premarital counseling and has committed "to
take all reasonable efforts to preserve [the] marriage, including mari-
tal counseling."4 7 The attestation must be signed by both parties and
be notarized. 48 The parties must also sign an affidavit that they have
received
premarital counseling from a priest, minister, rabbi, clerk of the Religious So-
ciety of Friends, any clergyman of any religious sect, or a marriage counselor,
which counseling shall include a discussion of the seriousness of covenant
marriage, communication of the fact that a covenant marriage is a commit-
ment for life, a discussion of the obligation to seek marital counseling in times
of marital difficulties, and a discussion of the exclusive grounds for legally
terminating a covenant marriage by divorce.4
9
In addition, the parties must also include a "notarized attestation,
signed by the counselor... confirming that the parties were counseled
as to the nature and purpose of the marriage and the grounds for ter-
mination thereof."50
2. The Fault and Fault-like Divorce Grounds
We need to have a law to help people stay married. Divorce ought to be hard
to get, and if it were more difficult, we'd see less of it.51
In addition to mandated counseling prior to seeking a divorce, peo-
ple who contract for a covenant marriage also opt themselves out of
the no-fault divorce option for dissolving their marriage. A standard
marriage in Louisiana may be dissolved if the couple separates for six
months. Under covenant marriage, divorce is theoretically much
harder to obtain. "Only when there has been a complete and total
breach of the marital covenant commitment may the non-breaching
party seek a declaration that the marriage is no longer legally recog-
nized."52 What constitutes a "total breach of the marital covenant
commitment" is as follows:
46. Carlson, supra note 43, at 21.
47. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:273A(1) (West Supp. 1998).
48. See id. § 9:273A(3)(a).
49. Id. § 9:273A(2)(a).
50. Id. § 9:273A(2)(b).
51. Rev. James Lancaster, assistant pastor of First Baptist Church of Kenner, La.
quoted in Wright, supra note 1, at 1E.
52. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:272 (West Supp. 1998).
1998]
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A. Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary and subsequent to the par-
ties obtaining counseling, a spouse to a covenant marriage may obtain a judg-
ment of divorce only upon proof of any of the following:
(1)The other spouse has committed adultery.
(2)The other spouse has committed a felony and has been sentenced to
death or imprisonment at hard labor.
(3)The other spouse has abandoned the matrimonial domicile for a period
of one year and constantly refuses to return.
(4)The other spouse has physically or sexually abused the spouse seeking
the divorce or a child of one of the spouses.
(5)The spouses have been living separate and apart continuously without
reconciliation for a period of two years. 5 3
The above divorce statute also specifies very similar grounds for a
legal separation, including the additional grounds of "habitual intem-
perance of the other spouse, or excesses, cruel treatment, or outrages
of the other spouse if, such ... is of such a nature as to render their
living together insupportable."54 This is important because parties le-
gally separated under this ground only have to wait one year from the
entry of the legal separation to obtain a divorce, so long as they lived
apart without reconciliation or lived apart for one and half years if
there were minor children from the marriage. 55
3. The Complete Disclosure Element of Covenant Marriage
"Well, what's your answer?" the Bride demands. "Do you want our marriage
to be high-test or low-grade?" The Groom hesitates; The Bride narrows her
eyes. "Maybe this is the clause that's bothering you: 'We have disclosed to
each other everything that could affect the decision to enter into a marriage.'
Is there something you haven't disclosed to me?" The Groom flushes. "Why
no, darling, nothing at all, really. Well, just one thing." "Is it another wo-
man?" "No ... of course not... it's, it's just that, well, I'm sorry, dear, I can't
live without Jerry Springer."5 6
In the language of the declaration of intent, the parties recite their
consent to create a covenant marriage. The spouses have to agree to
stay together for life. They must aver that they have undergone pre-
marital counseling, that they have read and understood the Covenant
Marriage Act, and that they agree to "take all reasonable efforts to
preserve [their] marriage, including marital counseling."5 7 In the
midst of this recitation that the parties must sign and notarize is a
further assertion that could prove extremely important to the legal
viability of a covenant marriage. The assertion reads: "We have cho-
sen each other carefully and disclosed to one another everything
53. Id. § 9:307A.
54. Id. § 9:307B.
55. See id. § 9:307A (6)(a), (b).
56. Mary McCarty, Do You Promise to Love, Honor and Not Watch Springer?, DAY-
TON DAILY NEWS, Nov. 21, 1997, at lB.
57. LA REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:273A(1) (West Supp. 1998).
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which could adversely affect the decision to enter into this
marriage."5 8
This clause in the covenant marriage contract raises a question as
to whether the authors of this legislation intended for a spouse in a
covenant marriage to be able to nullify the covenant marriage contract
if he or she can prove that the other spouse made a material false
representation of fact or failed to disclose something that could "ad-
versely effect the decision to enter into [the] marriage."5 9 Generally,
when a party to an ordinary contract makes "a representation of a
fact, known to be false, that is intended to and does deceive the other
party to his or her detriment," the deceived party has a cause of action
for fraud.60 Marriage has always been thought of as a special kind of
contract, and courts have generally allowed only misrepresentations
of fact affecting the decision to marry going to the "essentials" of the
marriage to be grounds for the marital equivalent of voiding the con-
tract-an annulment.6 1 Exactly what constitutes the "essentials" of
the marriage is a nebulous concept. American courts have interpreted
"essentials" to mean matters affecting the willingness or ability to
have sexual relations, the ability to bear children, or more generally,
fraud of such a magnitude that the court becomes convinced that the
continuing viability of the marriage is destroyed.6 2 Simple nondisclo-
sure or false representation of negative personal qualities, character,
or past history are insufficient. On the other hand, New York courts
do not necessarily require the fraud or nondisclosure to go to the "es-
sentials" of the marriage, but instead apply a fraud standard in mar-
riages more like the ordinary contract law standard of "materiality."63
Commentators have observed that the more stringent a state's di-
vorce grounds were in the latter half of the twentieth century, the
more liberally courts in those states construed fraud and nondisclo-
sure for the purposes of "essentials" of the marriage.64 The phrase
"everything that could adversely affect the decision to enter this mar-
riage" already suggests that a nondisclosure of a lesser magnitude
than "essentials" to the marriage could allow the unknowing party to
annul the covenant marriage and completely avoid the heightened
fault grounds necessary for divorce. The phrasing of the disclosure
requirement in the covenant marriage legislation may open the door
for courts to allow circumstances constituting less than fraud or non-
disclosure going to the "essentials" of marriage to annul or void the
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. LESLIE J. HARRIS Er AL., FAimy LAW 212 (1996).
61. See id. at 211.
62. See 1 HOMER H. CLAm, JR., THE LAW OF DOmESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 199 (2d ed. 1987).




covenant marriage contract. If the courts observed in states with re-
strictive divorce grounds, like New York, are any indication, a court
ruling on nondisclosure or fraud in a covenant marriage may be more
willing to void such a marriage, even if the fraud was simply "mate-
rial" to the decision to enter the covenant marriage, rather than
"essential."
B. Reactions to Covenant Marriage
The bride fidgeted beside a sign that read "Marriage License $25." The groom
lounged against the scuffed counter top. "Are you all interested in the new
covenant marriage?" a clerk asked them brightly. "What's that?" said the
groom ..... "It's just harder to get divorced," explained the clerk.... It's just a
whole bunch of counseling, that's all I can say."65
Few Louisianans have utilized the new covenant marriage option.
William Barlow, the state's registrar of vital records said in early Oc-
tober, 1997: "Only a sprinkling of newlyweds have chosen the more-
binding covenant nuptials .... It will take three or four months to
compile meaningful statistics."66 Even three months later, covenant
marriage in Louisiana was still not very popular. Out of 11,169 mar-
riage licenses issued in Louisiana from August 15, 1997 (the date the
new legislation took effect) until January 15, 1998, only 120 were cov-
enant marriages. 6 7 That constitutes about one percent. However, the
Bureau of Vital Statistics does not keep records of married couples
who have "upgraded" from their standard marriage to a covenant mar-
riage.68 On February 15, 1998, state representative Tony Perkins, the
author and sponsor of the covenant marriage legislation in Louisiana,
helped organize a "covenant marriage weekend" opportunistically co-
inciding with Valentine's Day to promote the marital option or up-
grade. Organizers were expecting about 400 to 500 couples to
participate.6 9
Government officials predict that the demand for covenant mar-
riages will rise as the public becomes more familiar with it and as
some pastors urge it on their flocks. 70 However, data shows that most
Louisiana couples apply for a marriage license just in time to fulfill
the state's seventy-two hour waiting period. If that is the first time
they learn about the requirements of covenant marriage, then there is
no time to get the necessary notarized documents and counseling.
65. Victoria Loe, Louisiana Tries More-Binding Marriage, THE SEATTLE TimEs, Oct.
5, 1997, at A18.
66. Id.
67. See Some Couples Seek Extra Commitment, DES MoiNEs REG., Feb. 15, 1998, at
002.
68. See id.
69. See Relma Hargus, Covenant Marriage Weekend Set Feb. 14-15, BATON ROUGE
ADvoc., Feb. 7, 1998, at 2E.
70. See Loe, supra note 65, at A18.
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A further obstacle for covenant marriage has emerged from a
rather unlikely source-some of the state's religious leaders. Approxi-
mately one-third of the Louisiana population is comprised of
Catholics. Louisiana's Roman Catholic bishops have withheld their
support from the covenant marriage laws. After studying the fine
print of the legislation, the bishops found that they opposed the re-
quirement in the premarital counseling that counselors preparing
couples for covenant marriage certify that they have explained cove-
nant marriage's higher standards for divorce. 7 1 The Bishops ex-
plained that their employees will not explore the subject matter of
divorce in their marriage preparation programs because to do so
"would confuse or obscure the integrity" of church teaching on the per-
manence of marriage.7 2 This will place covenant marriage at a practi-
cal disadvantage among the state's Catholics. Those couples would
not only have to undergo the Catholic Church's own mandatory pre-
marital counseling, but they would have to ask an additional coun-
selor to attest that they had been briefed on the required covenant
marriage divorce information.7 3
Rabbi David Goldstein of New Orleans opposes covenant mar-
riages and says he intends to advise against them. "I reject the entire
notion as utterly absurd. All marriages should be sacred. It implies
that some marriages are not sacred."7 4 The state's evangelicals were
initially very quiet as well. Some feared that a two-tiered marriage
system might lead to the creation of a third or fourth tier permitting
gay marriages. 75 A United Methodist Bishop called the new law "un-
necessary, confusing and intrusive."76 He continued:
The church's covenant marriage is sufficient for all seasons and circumstances
of marriage. For the state to develop a covenant marriage license utilizing the
language of the church's ceremony is to imply that persons will be more faith-
ful to their vows if the state so requires than if their religious faith so
requires. 7 7
An Episcopal Bishop opposed the legislation as well, stating that "[ilt
goes back to the old days regarding divorce. We've been there, and it
doesn't work. These old ideas compromised the moral character of
couples; they compromised the integrity of judges, courts and
attorneys."7 8
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IV. ADDRESSING THE CRITICISMS OF
COVENANT MARRIAGE
Covenant marriage has gotten off to a rocky start in Louisiana, but
it is still rather new. Meaningful reactions to it will take time. Given
the state's religious leaders' initial opposition to the law, the new leg-
islation is fighting an uphill battle. However, not all religious leaders
are against covenant marriage. Some pastors, particularly from more
rural Baptist areas, have adopted the covenant marriage ceremony as
the only kind of marriage they will perform. Although few couples are
currently affected by covenant marriage, it still raises some very im-
portant social and legal issues that warrant discussion.
A. The Coercion Factor
I am sure you'd choose the covenant if you really loved me, honey. 7 9
One important social policy issue with covenant marriage is the
coercion factor of one betrothed telling another that he or she wishes
to enter a covenant marriage. The spouse being asked is in a position
in which to say "no" sounds as though they have doubts about the
marriage. A spouse is not the only person who can pressure a couple
into a covenant marriage. Reverend Philip Robertson of Philadelphia
Baptist Church in Deville, Louisiana, said he only performs covenant
marriages now.80 He adds, "If a couple is unwilling to accept the legal
ties of a covenant marriage, they're worried the marriage may not
work."8 ' The legal ramifications of entering a covenant marriage af-
fect a couple economically because they are mandated to spend money
on premarital counseling and on predivorce counseling, if that need
should ever arise. Further, both spouses are opting out of the choice of
no-fault divorce. In sum, important legal and economic rights are at
stake. Agreeing to a covenant marriage limits both spouses legally
and financially. Divorce is hopefully the last thing on an engaged
couple's mind. A love-struck spouse will invariably have difficulty
saying no to their spouse-to-be or to their pastor when asked if they
want to make their marriage stronger and more resistant to divorce.
The possible coercion factor involved in covenant marriage impli-
cates another important aspect of legislation that, like covenant mar-
riage, limits a spouse's ability to leave a marriage. While the United
States Supreme Court has never found a constitutional right to di-
vorce, it has recognized that individuals have a fundamental right to
make personal intimate decisions relating to marriage. In Zablocki v.
79. Madeleine Kingsley, Get the Hell Out of a Heavenly Match, TmsS (London), Nov.
29, 1997, (Features), at 6.




Redhail,S2 the Court held that the right to marry is of fundamental
importance and struck down a Wisconsin statute that barred mar-
riage licenses to individuals who could not prove compliance with pre-
existing child support obligations.83 After Zablocki, states could not
set forth laws that "significantly interfere with decisions to enter into
the marital relationship."8 4 In Boddie v. Connecticut,8 5 the Court
held that requiring filing fees in divorce actions violated the due pro-
cess rights of indigents who were unable to pay the fees and get di-
vorced.S6 In closing, the Court referred to access to court for a divorce
as a right to "the exclusive precondition to the adjustment of a funda-
mental human relationship."8 7
Covenant marriage does not bar people completely from access to
divorce; entry into a covenant marriage is optional. However, this line
of United States Supreme Court cases does suggest that there are lim-
its to what a state may do to impede a citizen from reasonable access
to divorce and remarriage. Thus, there is a question as to whether a
party who was coerced into agreeing to a covenant marriage could be
limited in access to divorce. A further question lies in whether indi-
gent parties to a covenant marriage seeking a divorce could be barred
from divorce proceedings because they could not afford to pay for the
predivorce counseling mandated by covenant marriage's divorce laws
before any dissolution proceedings can begin.
B. Feminist Objections
Some of the feminist objections to covenant marriage naturally
build upon objections to coerced covenant marriages. When there is an
imbalance of power in a relationship, the less powerful party can be
more easily coerced. Power in a marriage often has ties to which party
is the primary wage earner. Although many women are now wage
earners themselves, women are still economically disadvantaged in
the workplace. Most men are still the primary wage earners in the
family, particularly if young children are involved. 8S Women in Loui-
siana earn sixty cents for every dollar earned by men in Louisiana.8 9
As such, women in Louisiana are kept systematically poorer than
their male peers. 90 Thus, it is logical to assume that women will be
more susceptible to coercion into a covenant marriage and, once in
82. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
83. See id. at 375, 383.
84. Id. at 386.
85. 401 U.S 371 (1971).
86. See id. at 382.
87. Id. at 383.
88. See Bradford, supra note 19, at 634.




one, be trapped by its more restrictive divorce laws. The longer sepa-
ration period or the difficulty proving one of covenant marriage's
grounds for breach will make it harder for a spouse who is financially
dependant on the other spouse to obtain a divorce.
Perhaps the people most harmed by a return to fault principles will
be those who need to exit a marriage quickly. Those people are typi-
fied by abused spouses. Women comprise a disproportionate number
of the victims of domestic violence. Even though the covenant mar-
riage legislation provides that violence is an express divorce ground,
victims of domestic violence will likely be reluctant to testify against
their abuser for fear of retribution. Even if the abused spouse is able
to exit the marriage safely and is prepared to testify as to the abuse,
the covenant marriage laws stipulate that an intent to participate in
the mandatory predivorce marriage counseling must be revealed.
Further, the options of collusion and of migration to establish domicile
in another state to avoid covenant marriage's fault divorce grounds
may be unavailable.
It is unclear for covenant marriage in Louisiana whether the fault
grounds for divorce also carry with them the fault based property divi-
sion scheme. The old fault regime embodied the idea that fault and
alimony were damages for a breach of the terms of the marriage con-
tract.9 1 Women who breached the marital contract through desertion,
adultery, or other fault grounds were denied support payments from
their "innocent" husbands. Conversely, men who breached paid for
this transgression economically with continued support. Many who
advocate for a return to fault principles see this as a benefit, as both
spouses had economic incentives to stay in the marriage. 92 With the
advent of no-fault, alimony and property settlements were for the
most part severed from a placing of fault and instead sprung from
equity.
However, some feminists criticize the fault based property distri-
bution scheme as more damaging to women. 93 Since men in Louisi-
ana earn more on average than women, a return to the economic
incentives inherent in the fault system will have a greater impact on
women than men. Furthermore, some argue that courts in their
"fault-finding" analysis exhibit a double standard for women and men
in fault behaviors.94 An example is given by analogy to child custody
cases. In areas of sexual behavior or work/family preferences, courts
are more likely to rule that a woman at "fault" is less able to provide a
91. See Margaret F. Brinig & Steven M. Crafton, Marriage and Opportunism, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 869, 876 (1994).
92. See id.




child a suitable home and identical behavior by a man is less penal-
ized.95 There is also more social stigma attached to female adulterers.
A counter argument is that, under a fault regime, the truly inno-
cent spouse or the spouse who does not want to dissolve the marriage
has more power. Under no-fault, one spouse can unilaterally dissolve
the marriage. Under a fault system or under covenant marriage,
either both spouses will have to agree to collude to establish a fault
ground or the guilty spouse wishing to exit, likely the more financially
independent spouse, will have to bargain with the innocent often less
financially solvent spouse. Again, as most women are the less finan-
cially stable partner in the marriage, non-breaching women may in
some instances profit from a return to fault under covenant marriage.
C. Conflict of Laws Issues
An interesting legal issue raised by covenant marriage is whether
the principles of conflicts of laws will enable a couple to evade the fault
divorce hurdles of covenant marriage simply by going to a state that
does not have covenant marriage. Migration to a divorce mill state
was a favorite way to evade the lingering fault divorce regimes pres-
ent in many states. This worked because in divorce cases, courts have
typically applied their own divorce laws to marriages that were en-
tered into in other states.9 6 Divorce proceedings are rather unique in
this area because "[in all other interstate cases, the forum state ap-
plies its own choice of law to determine which state's substantive law
should govern the controversy."9 7
In a non-divorce case, if a state court enters a judgment but lacks
personal jurisdiction over the defendant, that judgment is void be-
cause it violates the Due Process Clause. In divorce cases, so long as
the petitioning spouse is domiciled in the rendering state, the divorce
decree is valid there and everywhere else. The marriage can be dis-
solved even if the court has no personal jurisdiction over the defend-
ant spouse.98 A modern example of how this works and how it can
help spouses to evade a state's more restrictive divorce law is Perito v.
Perito.99 The Perito marriage lasted twenty-five years. They were
married in New York and lived there for all of their married life.100
While still in New York, Ruth Perito separated from her husband and
filed for divorce. The New York court dismissed the petition because
Ruth did not prove the requisite grounds required by New York di-
95. See id.
96. See Rhonda Wasserman, Divorce and Domicile: Time to Sever the Knot, 39 Wm.&
MARY L. Ray. 1, 2 (1997).
97. Id.
98. See id.
99. 756 P.2d 895 (Alaska 1988).
100. See id. at 896.
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vorce law at that time.' 0 ' Subsequently, Mrs. Perito contacted law-
yers and began looking into the divorce laws of Nevada and Alaska.
After being consulted, she flew to Alaska with a friend and, within a
few hours of arrival, announced to her friend "that she felt sure this
was the place she wanted to be."10 2 The next day she filed for divorce
in Alaska. There were no child custody matters involved, and Ruth
did not ask the Alaska court to determine any property or alimony
matters.' 0 3 Mr. Perito moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and
claimed that Mrs. Perito was not an Alaska domiciliary. The Alaska
court denied the motion and granted the divorce.
Under Alaska law, "for a divorce uncomplicated by alimony, prop-
erty division or child custody" the jurisdictional requirements do not
contain any explicit residency requirements. 0 4 According to the Re-
statement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, "a state has power to exercise
judicial jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage of spouses one of whom is
domiciled in the state."'o 5 The requirements of domicile are that a
person must be physically present in a place and that he or she "must
intend to make that place his home for the time at least."o6 In Wil-
liams v. North Carolina, 3O the United States Supreme Court held
that domicile is an adequate basis for divorce jurisdiction.
State sovereignty has long justified the conflict of laws and the
domicile rules present in divorce law. Domestic relations are consid-
ered matters of the state where a person is domiciled.' 0 8 It is argued
that a state has the most interest in the domestic relations of its domi-
ciliaries. However, prior to the onset of no-fault, divorce law in states
diverged so widely that "suitcase divorces" became a widespread prac-
tice. 10 9 Unhappy couples who could not obtain divorces at home be-
gan going to states with more permissive divorce laws and obtaining
divorces there.11o While many states have restrictive residency re-
quirements before they are willing to divorce an arrival in their state,
others like Alaska do not. Even more importantly, while it is possible
101. See id. At that time the New York divorce law permitted divorce on the following
grounds: (1) Cruel and inhuman treatment; (2) abandonment; (3) confinement of
the defendant in prison for three consecutive years; (4) adultery; (5) living apart
pursuant to a judgment of separation for one or more years; (6) living apart pur-
suant to a written agreement for one or more years. See N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw
§ 170 C170:1 (McKinney 1988).
102. Perito v. Perito, 756 P.2d 895, 896 (Alaska 1988).
103. See id.
104. See id. at 897.
105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 71 (1971).
106. Id. §§ 16, 18.
107. 317 U.S. 287, 298-301 (1942)(Williams I).
108. See Wasserman, supra note 96, at 50.
109. See David P. Currie, Suitcase Divorce in the Conflict of Laws: Simons, Rosenstiel,
and Borax, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 26 (1966).
110. See Wasserman, supra note 96, at 13.
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for a unilateral divorce to be challenged on jurisdictional grounds,1 1 1
as in Perito, a bilateral divorce cannot be challenged on jurisdictional
grounds.1 12
The above overview of conflict of laws demonstrates that evading
fault divorce laws has in the past been a common practice. There is
little that separates the grounds necessary for divorce under covenant
marriage from those present in New York at the time that Ruth Perito
was seeking a divorce. 1i 3 It is likely that Alaska would treat a domi-
ciliary who had entered into a covenant marriage the same way. The
dissolution of the marriage in Alaska, so long as the petitioning spouse
had established domicile, would have full faith and credit everywhere,
even Louisiana. Further, if one spouse of a covenant marriage were to
establish domicile in another state, the other could attempt to thwart
the dissolution and challenge jurisdiction, but if one spouse estab-
lished domicile and the other agreed to the proceeding, then there
would be no way to challenge the divorce action on jurisdiction. Under
the circumstances in Perito, it is unlikely that the foreign court could
have enough interest and personal jurisdiction to decide property set-
tlements and child custody issues, but the foreign court could likely
dissolve even a covenant marriage.
There is more of a contract nature to covenant marriage than there
is to most marriages. A court outside of Louisiana may make a natu-
ral analogy to premarital agreements. Covenant marriage could be
construed as a state sanctioned premarital agreement, whereby poten-
tial spouses are allowed to stipulate the divorce grounds and to other
requirements that for them will be necessary to prove before entering
or dissolving their marriage. All states recognize premarital agree-
ments between prospective spouses that are designed to keep the par-
ties' property separate."i 4 When premarital agreements begin to
address the parties' respective property and support rights in the
event of divorce, most courts will still allow such provisions to be
valid, but they do so more hesitantly."i 5 This stems from the common
law view that a premarital contract containing terms anticipating di-
vorce is contrary to public policy."i 6 The rationale is that such agree-
ments are conducive to divorce. While more and more states have
111. See Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945)(Williams I).
112. See Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
113. See Perito v. Perito, 756 P.2d 895 (Alaska 1988).
114. See 3 ALEXANDER LnDEY AND Louis I. PARLEY, Ln'DEY ON SEPARATION AGREE-
AiENTS AND ANTENpriiAL CONTRACTS § 90.1 (1998).
115. See id. § 90.11. Marital property disposition in the event of divorce is recognized
as a valid premarital agreement provision in the eighteen states that have
adopted the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act under section 3(a)3, twenty one





moved beyond this thinking in the areas of clauses dealing with ali-
mony and marital property, most states still have a threshold whereby
a clause in a prenuptial agreement can still be void because it is found
to be against public policy. One example would be a premarital agree-
ment that addressed the issue of the custody of the parties' children
upon separation or divorce. Such provisions have generally been
found to be violative of public policy because it reflects "an effort to
deny the courts the authority to ultimately decide the issue."117 Pro-
visions attempting to bargain away or set the extent of a party's obli-
gation to pay child support 1 s would be another example of prenuptial
agreement terms found to be contrary to public policy.
As divorce has become more common, courts have become more
willing to allow parties to contract in advance what will happen in the
event of their divorce in the arenas of property division and spousal
support. The question remains as to whether any court would recog-
nize an agreement entered into in another state that attempts to stip-
ulate what grounds must be proven in order to dissolve the marriage.
States have a strong public policy in favor of regulating the divorce
process. If that were not the case, states would not mandate that only
a court can legally dissolve a marriage. If a couple could make the
grounds for divorce more restrictive through a premarital agreement,
then what is to stop them from making the grounds less than "irrecon-
cilable differences?" If child custody and child support issues are over-
whelmingly deemed off limits to prospective spouses, it seems logical
to assume that most states would find grounds for divorce in that cate-
gory, too.
One intriguing possibility exists in states that have adopted the
Uniform Premarital Agreement Act. In section 3(a)(8), the Act stipu-
lates that "[p]arties to a premarital agreement may contract with re-
spect to any . . . matter, including their personal rights and
obligations, not in violation of public policy or a statute imposing a
criminal penalty."119 That provision clearly opens the door for a court
to allow premarital private ordering of the marital contract up to the
point where it violates a state's public policy. This section has not yet
been construed in light of a premarital agreement that attempts to
alter the state's divorce grounds. However, the language clearly indi-
cates that it would be possible to do so, absent a finding that con-
tracting for only fault-like divorce grounds was against public policy.
The Covenant Marriage Act, however misguided some may feel it is,
was enacted for the purpose of making marriages more viable. The
rhetoric of strengthening marriages could make it difficult for some on
the bench to find covenant marriage as violative of public policy. On
117. Id. § 90.10.
118. See, e.g., Rogers v. Yourshaw, 448 S.E.2d 884, 886-87 (Va. Ct. App. 1994).
119. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT AcT § 3(a)(8), 9B U.L.A. 373 (1987).
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the other hand, a competing state policy is the state's right to exert
control over its domiciliary's marital status. However, it is possible
that a state adopting the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act could
construe a Louisiana covenant marriage as a premarital contract and
find that its provisions are not violative of public policy.
V. CONCLUSION
Covenant marriage is a well-meaning attempt to make marriages
stronger, healthier, and more viable. The counseling requirements
will go the furthest in achieving this goal. The more prospective
spouses know each other and have discussed marital issues, the more
likely a successful marriage will ensue. However, mandatory counsel-
ing is never as effective as counseling that people truly want to un-
dergo. If parties undergo counseling simply to fulfill a necessary
requirement incident to getting a covenant marriage then it will likely
not be as effective. Further, if the state of Louisiana really believes in
the benefits of counseling, then why not make it mandatory, as some
have suggested, in all marriages. This would not be an unconstitu-
tional barrier to marriage, especially if the state would be willing to
provide for it financially. If it is truly effective in keeping marriages
intact, the state would recover its expenditures by incurring fewer ex-
penses in social welfare resulting from the culture of divorce.
However beneficial the counseling requirements may turn out to
be, these benefits are more than offset in the damage caused by a re-
turn to fault divorce. Divorce under the fault regime was frequently
more similar to a theatrical production than a legal matter. Collusion
and migration to avoid restrictive divorce laws proved effective in
evading these laws in the past and will do so again.
Finally, trying to save marriages through more stringent divorce
laws is a losing proposition. By the time couples reach the stage
where divorce is anticipated, delay and larger obstacles to exit from
the marriage are unproductive. If the fault regime had one lesson to
teach, it was that couples who desire to divorce will do so. Covenant
marriage will do nothing to change that proposition.
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